UN Report Details Houthis' Attack Capabilities

The annual report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, prepared for the UN Security Council and published this year on October 17, has an established reputation for producing carefully researched and well-substantiated information on the situation in Yemen. This latest report covered the 12 months from August 1, 2024. Insofar as it reports on Houthi attacks on shipping, it is essential reading for security experts advising the maritime community on threats posed in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The report identifies that sanctions imposed on the Houthis have been relatively ineffective in constraining the Houthis' ability to purchase equipment needed to mount their attacks on shipping - where indeed this is not being supplied by Iran free of charge. Although still dazed after the 12-Day War, Iran still seems to be supporting the Houthis.

The report identifies an increase in arms shipment seizures, which it attributes mostly to the closure of port facilities in Houthi controlled areas following US and Israeli attacks. Consignments have been diverted from Hodeidah to Aden instead, and material seized which the Houthis had been attempting to smuggle through border controls with false customs declarations hidden in nondescript containers.

The experts assess that Israeli, UK and US strikes over the summer have depleted stocks of missiles and drones, and killed a number of technical experts, but that sufficient capability and expertise remains for the Houthis to continue their campaign - though the attrition was no doubt a factor in the Houthis agreeing to pause their attacks following Omani mediation. A tangible consequence of the air strikes had been the erosion of trust between Houthi leaders, who fear strikes had been aided by some amongst their number, suspicions which have led to increased surveillance and arrests.

In terms of Houthi attacks, the UN experts counted 101 ballistic missiles fired at Israel, of which 57 were intercepted, 38 failed and four impacted in Israel. Most were launched from Sa‘dah and Amran Governorates. IRGC Quds Force Brigadier Abdulreza Shalai has now apparently left, but other IRGC and Hezbollah members remain in Yemen to assist the Houthis with these missile and drone operations.

At sea, 25 vessels were attacked, nine of which were merchant vessels. MV Eternity C (IMO 9588249), MV Magic Seas (IMO 9736169) and MV Sounion (IMO 9312145) were sunk and suffered casualties, the crew of MV Galaxy Leader (IMO 9237307) taken hostage were released, and MV Cordelia Moon (IMO 9297888, now MV Walrus) was damaged by a planted explosive device.

These attacks have generally followed the same pattern; the target is surrounded by armed groups in small boats and attacked with drones, bringing it to a halt. It is then attacked with ballistic missiles whose targeting mechanisms are insufficiently sophisticated to be able to hit moving targets. The attack on the MV Minervagracht (IMO 9571521) in the Gulf of Aden on September 29, post the cut-off period for the UN report, suggests that this particular technical limitation may have been overcome, and that the Houthis are now able to engage fast-moving targets.

The report details extensive links between the Houthis and Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia. The Houthis provide arms and training, Al Shabaab facilitate use of Somali ports for shipments of arms to the Houthis. Al Shabaab militants are trained by the Houthis in Yemen. This cooperation exists notwithstanding that the two groups are at opposite ends of the Shi'a-Sunni extremist divide.

The report details how the "Houthis have a child recruitment strategy which combines ideological indoctrination, militarized education and selective access to aid," and how this is "reshaping Yemeni society to produce a generation of loyal, uneducated fighters."

In summary, the capability of the Houthis to mount attacks on maritime targets associated with Israel in particular and the West generally has been reduced but not destroyed, which has prompted the Houthis to pause to restock. The ideological determination to carry on the war remains undiminished, and has perhaps been enhanced by identifying external enemies that can act as a focus for patriotic ardor; in this context, the Houthis talk of an entirely fictitious "17 nation anti-Houthi coalition."

There is some disunity in Houthi ranks, and the internal security crackdown can be expected to diminish operational efficiency - frightening some into withdrawal and disabling some competent leaders falsely accused. The Houthi capability and intent remains therefore more or less intact; what is more uncertain is if the Houthis can maintain the unity of their coalition, and whether those they wish to target will allow them to spread their influence and continue to threaten innocent passage.