Less is more: The plague of “audit explosion” in maritime operations
In the maritime industry, every operation, from cargo loading to enclosed-space entry, is governed by procedures meant to demonstrate control. Yet the phenomenon of “audit explosion” creates a troubling paradox: the systems designed to improve maritime safety can sometimes undermine it.
This paradox echoes what sociologist Michael Power described as the “audit explosion.” In The Audit Society, published in 1997, Power noted the rapid spread of auditing beyond finance into nearly every part of organizational life. Today, audits monitor performance, compliance, quality, and risk management. While their goal is accountability, auditing can reshape work, sometimes prioritizing documentation over reality.
From financial oversight to operational control
Auditing began as a tool to verify financial integrity. Corporate scandals, regulatory reforms, and rising global complexity transformed auditing into a universal tool of governance. Governments and corporations rely on audits to restore trust, manage risk, and demonstrate accountability to regulators, insurers, and the public.
Shipping was a natural target for this shift. Modern vessels operate under multiple layers of scrutiny: flag state inspections, port state control, classification society surveys, insurance assessments, and internal company audits. Each entity seeks assurance that safety and operational systems are functioning properly, primarily through documentation.
This has created a system in which safety is not only practiced but continuously recorded, verified, and audited.
The logic seems straightforward. If every risk is assessed, every procedure documented, and every step verified, accidents should become less likely. But Kristine Vedal Størkersen, Research manager, SINTEF Ocean, and Nippin Anand, Founder and CEO of Novellus Solutions, warn that this logic has limits.
When paperwork competes with safety
Anand points to the 2015 capsizing of the car carrier Höegh Osaka shortly after leaving Southampton. Technical and stability issues contributed to the accident, but the administrative burden on the ship’s officers was striking.
The chief officer, responsible for cargo stability and safety, reportedly had to complete more than 200 separate checks during a limited port stay. These checks were part of a safety management system designed to ensure control and compliance, yet they consumed time and attention, both scarce during complex operations.
That accident gives us an opportunity to see how far paperwork has reached on board ships and how bureaucracy has turned against its original intent
… Anand said in the podcast discussion.
The problem is not that procedures exist. Procedures are essential. The problem arises when documentation competes directly with operational awareness.
When officers must satisfy extensive documentation requirements, cognitive workload increases. In extreme cases, attention shifts from managing risks to managing paperwork.
Auditing documentation, not reality
A central critique raised by Kristine Størkersen and Anand is that audits often measure compliance with procedures rather than the effectiveness of safety itself.
Ships undergo inspections from multiple stakeholders, each seeking proof that safety systems are in place. That proof usually takes the form of written procedures, completed checklists, and signed risk assessments.
Størkersen explained that shore officers often want to see documentation to ensure that the vessel is under control and sailing smoothly. This creates a strong incentive to produce documentation even if it does not accurately reflect conditions on board.
The result is an “illusion of control.” Risk assessments may be completed and signed, but conditions may have changed. Checklists may be filled out correctly, but hazards remain. Documentation provides reassurance, not necessarily safety.
This gap between formal compliance and operational reality can have fatal consequences.
Størkersen’s views on how audits and excessive paperwork undermine maritime safety are also summarized in the video below:
The deadly example of enclosed spaces
Taking one case as an example, Anand points out that despite the checklists, enclosed-space fatalities continue to occur. Risk assessments are completed. Permits are signed. Procedures are followed, at least on paper.
The paperwork has already been signed off, and yet people are dying
… Anand said.
Documentation can create a false sense of security. Crew members may assume risks have been controlled because procedures are formally completed, even if hazards remain. The documentation of enclosed spaces is not done by seafarers, but rather, seafarers assume that it is safe to enter that space.
There is an unknown risk which has been made to look like it’s been controlled
… Anand explained.
When compliance becomes the goal, safety can become secondary.
Why safety systems keep expanding
The growth of auditing in maritime operations is driven by several forces. Some of these, according to Størkersen, include the following:
- The need for accountability: Shipping companies must show regulators, insurers, and clients that risks are being managed responsibly. Documentation provides tangible proof.
- The fear of accidents, lawsuits, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties: Adding procedures can appear to reduce legal and financial exposure even if it does little to improve operational safety.
- Auditing itself encourages standardization: Auditors prefer systems that are consistent and easy to evaluate. This leads companies to formalize and expand procedures, making them easier to inspect but often more cumbersome to use.
Over time, Safety Management Systems grow larger and more complex. Each incident leads to new procedures. Each audit finding leads to new documentation requirements. Rarely are procedures removed. Thus, the industry moves toward over-regulation even if it strives for de-regulation.
Størkersen calls this “auditism,” when organizations focus on passing audits rather than managing risks.
The human cost of bureaucratic safety
For seafarers, the consequences are real. Excessive auditing increases workload, reduces autonomy, and creates stress. Crew may spend more time completing forms than reflecting on actual risks. Experienced seafarers may feel their judgment is undervalued, replaced by rigid procedures designed far from the ship.
This shift also affects organizational culture. When compliance dominates, individuals focus on avoiding audit findings rather than improving safety. Innovation and adaptability, essential in unpredictable environments such as those onboard a vessel, can be discouraged.
Safety systems designed to reduce risk may inadvertently create new risks by diverting attention from critical tasks.
A system at a turning point
Auditing remains essential. It promotes transparency, accountability, and learning. Many maritime safety improvements have come from oversight and systematic analysis.
The problem is not auditing itself, but its unchecked expansion. Safety systems must be simplified and refocused. Audits should evaluate whether procedures actually improve safety. Documentation should support operational judgment, not replace it.
The audit explosion began as a tool to create safer, more accountable organizations. Too much auditing, however, can create its own dangers.
Safety at sea depends not on paperwork alone, but on the people who navigate the vessels.
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