Shadow ports: how cutting off Russia’s access to maritime trade could help sanctions have real impact
SANCTIONS against Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” have not stopped the flow of Russian oil and thus have neither frozen the Russian economy nor thwarted Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. By contrast, the sanctions have pushed Russian oil to Asia, where it has created closer relationships between Russia and key states that have similar anti-Western inclinations including China and North Korea.
Ineffective sanctions enforcement has helped major states establish a fully operational “sanctioned economy” that is big enough to compete with the world’s legitimate and illicit economies. In that regard, Russia’s trade surplus actually peaked in 2024, increasing by 8% to $152bn.
According to the latest forecast by the Bank of Russia, this figure will be lower in 2025 — $111bn. But this is still a huge amount, allowing the destruction of Ukrainian cities to continue and Russia’s wider malign influence to proliferate. It is time, therefore, that Europe and the wider West recognise they have another tool that they have not used before: putting pressure on ports that serve Russia’s shadow fleet*.
If vessels cannot call at ports, they cannot engage in trade. Every state has the sovereign right to deny any vessel access to its ports, and the states that have an interest in curtailing Russian aggression should start to use this power more proactively.
Both denying the shadow fleet access to European ports and sanctioning extraterritorial ports that give access to the shadow fleet will help diminish the logistics of the Russian Federation’s Baltic terminals, through which the shadow fleet continues to deliver millions of barrels of oil to Asia each month. It will also make states in other parts of the world think twice about allowing shadow fleet vessels into their ports, lest they end up themselves being sanctioned.
Workable definition
But to even start this process, a preliminary element is required: define the shadow fleet. Right now, it is a colloquial term. The International Maritime Organization has issued a general definition of “a dark fleet” or “a shadow fleet” but it is not sufficiently precise to make a consistent determination of what vessels are and are not included. The key question is: could a watch stander at a maritime operations centre use the definition to identify which vessels are and are not part of the shadow fleet? Thus far, the answer is no.
The closest to a workable definition of the shadow fleet has been established by Lloyd’s List, but to take action on something, everyone needs to know what actually is that something. So, the first step has to be to come to an agreement on what the amorphous shadow fleet actually is. Then the second step has to be to make it unattractive for any port to receive a shadow fleet vessel.
No tanker of any age can remain on the high seas forever: they need to refuel, purchase provisions and water, undergo maintenance and engage in other activities that support the main functions of trade. Imposing sanctions on ports that serve and support the shadow fleet will help remove the cargo flow of European operators from them and deprive them of insurance and financial support from recognised market participants. It is unlikely that Russia, even with its partners and enablers like China, will be able to offer anything to replace them. The same sanctions should be applied to ships that offer what amount to port services in international waters by servicing the shadow fleet.
After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU, the US and several other countries imposed sanctions against the ports of Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia, Kerch and Yevpatoria, banning any ship calls, equipment deliveries and investments in port infrastructure. The time has come to expand the geography of port sanctions and other restrictive measures. Ports and even canals at critical chokepoints, if made inaccessible to the shadow fleet, would have a significant impact. Without those transit points, Russian tankers may not be able to embark on the lengthy, risky and costly journeys to circumvent normal sea lanes.
But even short of sanctioning the ports, there is another approach. Every port to be part of the international trade system, has to be audited under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Established in 2004 as a response to the terrorist attacks on the US of September 11, 2001, the ISPS Code falls within the Safety of Life at Sea Convention.
Ports must demonstrate compliance with the code, or international vessels either will not call at those ports, or insurance premiums to use the ports will increase. Instead of simply sanctioning the ports, therefore, another approach would be to seek to have them deemed ports of non-compliance under the ISPS Code on account of servicing the shadow fleet. The risks of environmental spill, safety hazard and other problems that are replete within the shadow fleet would more than warrant such a black mark on the ports that allow them to operate.
Finally, more can be done to encourage ports to voluntarily reject the shadow fleet. The Port Authorities Roundtable, for example, is the sort of forum that could discuss the practical concerns relating to servicing shadow fleet vessels and come to a resolution on how to handle or reject them.
Additionally, regional and subregional agreements of such a nature could be reached in different parts of the world, making it more difficult for the shadow fleet to operate, Russian oil to make its way to customers, and the Russian Federation to afford to maintain its unlawful assault on Ukraine.
While issuing sanctions against ships and shipowners associated with the “shadow fleet” has become a favourite tool of states, the results have clearly not been as dramatic or effective as desired. Part of the problem is that sanctions enforcement at sea is incredibly difficult as navies and coastguards struggle to add such responsibilities to an already overwhelming list of requirements.
A more functional approach, therefore, is to focus on the point where those ocean-going ships come into contact with the land. Since every state has more experience in terrestrial enforcement matters than maritime enforcement, ports should become the main focus of efforts to subdue the Russian economy and with it Russia’s unlawful aggression.
Oleh Dunda is a Ukrainian lawmaker from Dnipro representing the Servant of the People party. He is a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on the Organization of State Power.
Dr. Ian Ralby is president of Auxilium Worldwide, a charitable non-profit committed to global harmony, and an expert in maritime law and security. He has worked on maritime security issues in over 100 countries and has supported the Ukraine Navy since the outset of the invasion in 2022.
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