Iran shipments to Houthis a masterclass in AIS manipulation
MONTHS of relative calm in the Red Sea abruptly ended last week when the Houthis carried out devastating attacks on two vessels, sinking both and killing nine seafarers.
While the tactics on display in the targeting of Magic Seas (IMO: 9736169) and Eternity C (IMO: 9588249) were familiar, the deployment of previously unused anti-ship ballistic missiles appeared to confirm recent security intelligence reports indicating that the Houthis had been restocking their arsenals over recent months.
Analysis of video footage from the attack on Eternity C indicated that ‘Al Bahr Al Ahmar’ and ‘Faleq-1’ missiles were used, possibly in conjunction with an anti-ship cruise missile from the C-801 family, likely either the Iranian “Noor” variant or the Houthi-produced ‘Al Mandab’, with an estimated range of approximately 200 km.
Despite US and Israeli air strikes on Houthi bases and reports of some seizures of dhows carrying weapons heading into Houthi territory, security analysts have been warning that weapons and components have continued to flow into Yemen.
Intelligence reports suggest that the Houthis continued to restock critical components to assemble ASBMs locally, but also managed to receive a number of additional munitions.
That restocking process has been happening for several months.
The Houthis have been receiving what a UN panel of experts described as an ‘unprecedented’ amount of military materiel, a significant amount of which is being moved through the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef.
A Lloyd’s List investigation gives a small insight into this opaque supply chain, revealing the sophisticated manipulation used to complicate efforts to track shipments and difficulties in disrupting these operations.
In its 2024 report, the UN panel of experts identified six vessels for calling at Houthi-controlled ports without receiving clearance from the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism.
UNVIM is a body that monitors and inspects cargo bound for Yemeni ports not under the internationally recognised government’s control. Its purpose is to facilitate trade into these ports while helping to uphold the arms embargo.
Comoros-flagged aggregates carrier Almas (IMO: 8864957), can be tracked using Automatic Identification System data calling at Hodeidah in October 2023.
Almas did not stop in Djibouti, where UNVIM is based and inspections are carried out, after sailing from Iran.
The entire voyage can be viewed using AIS positions, but an assessment of the messages reveal the efforts taken to conceal the ship’s identity and movements.
Almas never actually transmits its International Maritime Organization number over the course of the voyage. This is because the ship stopped using a class A AIS transponder in October 2022, transmitting only through a class B system from that point onwards.
Class B transponders are designed for smaller vessels. They generally have a smaller data package, with many of the data fields being empty or reporting “not available”, including the IMO number. The data is also not reported as often as class A.
“It’s kind of like pulling up your hood and trying to walk through a busy crowd,” says Lloyd’s List Intelligence data scientist Thomas Spriggs.
Any ship over 300 gt engaging in international voyages are required to have a class A AIS system on board. Almas is 446 gt.
The use of the class B transponder means the only identifying number being transmitted by Almas during its voyage from Iran to Hodeidah is a Maritime Mobile Service Identity number.
A MMSI is a unique nine-digit number assigned to a vessel by a flag registry for identifying and communicating via radio and AIS. The MMSI shows the flag the vessel claims to be flying.
Almas was fraudulently using an MMSI affiliated with the Belize at the time.
The Belize flag registry told Lloyd’s List that Almas was only given a special registration valid for three months in 2022 for a voyage from Japan to South Korea.
It was cancelled at the end of May 2022.
Almas did not enable its class A system again, and transmit an IMO number, until August 19, 2024. It did so with a different MMSI that is affiliated with Comoros.
Almas continued to sail with both systems on board.
“The use of two AIS transponders on board does show malicious intent as they are actively swapping AIS data for a period of time, even if in this case it’s just the type and amount of data being transmitted,” said Spriggs.
While Almas highlights some of the tactics used to complicate the tracking of shipments out of Iran, not all voyages are given so much effort.
Vessel tracking data captured a then Tanzania-flagged general cargoship’s arrival to Saleef in May 2024.
Shahin (IMO: 9104378) sailed from Bandar Abbas on April 18, 2024, arriving in Saleef on 1 May 2024.
According to AIS data, Shahin reflagged to Comoros shortly before its return to the Middle East Gulf.
Almas and Shahin are the only two direct voyages from Iran to Houthi-controlled ports captured by AIS since 2023.
Most of the vessels calling to Hodeidah and Saleef do stop at Djibouti first, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence callings data, suggesting at least an initial cargo check is completed by UNVIM.
Experts say that vessels that do report for inspection are still able to circumvent the arms embargo.
There is evidence that ships, after inspection, go out and meet with dhows, likely to load things like weapons, before heading into a Houthi-controlled port.
The scale and nature of the activity makes interdiction extremely difficult.
“It’s impossible to stop every ship. There are simply too many and most are disguised in ways that make detection difficult,” said Nadwa Al-Dawsari, a non-resident fellow at the Irregular Warfare Initiative.
“No-one has the resources to inspect every suspicious or potentially suspicious vessel, and it’s just not practical.”
Some regional analysts argue UNVIM is not equipped to tackle smuggling into Houthi-controlled ports.
UNVIM’s team is small and has no enforcement capacity. It relies on vessels voluntarily submitting paperwork and reporting for inspection, and further faces practical limitations when checking cargo.
Importantly, UNVIM only grants clearance to vessels, with the ultimate approval for shipments being made by the Saudi-led Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Cell.
Saudia Arabia previously had naval assets placed at the approaches to the Houthi ports and were prepared to detain suspicious ships.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies said these assets were removed at some point in 2022, thereby eliminating a key incentive for UNVIM compliance.
The Houthis’ renewed attacks on shipping show the militant group is still well-equipped to wreak havoc in the Red Sea and their weapons smuggling supply chain remains intact.
A researcher who has been closely tracking smuggling to the Houthis and other regional actors says there are major challenges in attempting to disrupt this activity.
“The Houthis, IRGC, Hezbollah and others operate a sophisticated supply chain that can adapt quickly to interdiction efforts, including by shifting supplies from commercial containers to multiple land and sea smuggling routes,” they said.
The IRGC and Hezbollah have decades of experience in running smuggling operations, they added. The Houthis benefit from this as well as information-sharing between sanction evaders working in places like Venezuela and Russia.
Plus, everyone in the supply chain turns a profit.
“That makes for a pretty formidable, highly dynamic system that few state actors have the resources needed to understand let alone disrupt,” they said.
If the international community wanted to leverage the existing entity designed to limit suspicious imports to Houthi-controlled ports, they would need to provide better supports.
Wolf-Christian Paes, senior fellow for armed conflict at the IISS, said a naval presence close to the Houthi-controlled ports was necessary to act as a credible deterrence to ships refusing to undergo inspection in Djibouti.
UNVIM could further benefit from more funding to ensure they have enough inspectors to check incoming shipments.
Without any action, the Houthis will continue to build and expand their arsenal, and vessels will continue to be at risk as long as the Houthis have the intent to do so.
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